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to a fair trial when it failed to remove a prejudicial juror for
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2.

Whether the trial court denied the defendant his right

to a fair trial when it restri ted defense counsel's questions
during voir dire.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction rendered
against Mr. Tuero following a jury trial on December 12, 1986.
Following a pre-sentence investigation by Alcohol Counseling and
Education Center,
six months jail.

Mr. Tuero was sentenced to a suspended term of
He was also ordered to serve ten days community

service, attend Alcoholic Anonymous, pay a $500.00 fine and
surcharge, pay $100.00 into the victim restitution fund, and pay
$150.00 for alcohol treatment as conditions of his probation.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 30, 1986, Officer Bridge observed a driver he
believed was slumped over the wheel of his car on about Fifth South
at 300 West in Salt Lake City.

He followed the vehicle and about

five blocks later pulled the driver over for weaving.

The officer

testified Mr. Tuero was driving within the posted speed limit and

never hit the curb, drove off the road or sideswiped any cars.

The

officer never asked if Mr. Tuero's 1974 Dodge Dart had either
steering or mechanical problems.
The officer testified Mr. Tuero's speech was slurred
although the odor of alcohol about Mr. Tuero was only slight. Mr.
Tuero told the officer he had both diabetes and heart problems. Mr.
Tuero admitted to the officer he had had a "few beers" before
driving.

At trial, Mr. Tuero testified he had two beers before

driving.
The officer testified Mr. Tuero only flipped his fingers
around when asked to perform the field sobriety test involving
counting fingers and therefore the officer discontinued the tests
because he believed Mr. Tuero was uncooperative.

Mr. Tuero

testified he was hard of hearing and did not understand what was
being asked of him.
No intoxilyzer test was given.

Mr. Tuero testified he did

not take the test because he was afraid the "cops might beat him up"
and he just wanted to "get it over with."

The state trooper

performed a calculation using the Widmark formula and determined Mr.
Tuero's blood alcohol level would have been .00 based upon his
weight and the two beers he had consumed.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

Mr. Tuero's r i g h t to a f a i r t r i a l on the charge of DUI was
s u b s t a n t i a l l y abridged when the t r i a l court f a i l e d to remove a
venireperson for cause whose wife had been broadsided by a

drunk

driver.

Additionally, failure of the tria}. court to allow defense

counsel to inquire of the virepeople if any thought the penalties
for a DUI conviction were either too harsh or too light failed to
allow defense counsel to ascertain if such prejudices existed.

This

restriction interfered with Mr. Tuero's right to a fair trail.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
MR. TOERO WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL WHEN THE JUDGE
FAILED TO REMOVE A PREJUDICIAL JUROR FOR CAUSE.
During Voir Dire of the prospective jurors, defense counsel
moved to strike Mr. Carter for cause:
JUDGE:

Any of you have relatives or family members

or

friends who have been involved in a collision where a
person was alleged
Alcohol or Drugs?
#4:

to be Driving Under the Influence of
Alright, uh, let's see, Mr. Carter.

My wife was broadsided by a drunk driver.

JUDGE:

Alright.

Would your relationship there and your

knowledge of that uh, cause you to bring any bias to the
case[,] any feelings one way or another?

Do you think you

could decide [sic] the case fairly based solely upon the
evidence and the law?
(T. 10-11)

Mr. Matsuno also indicated he had two cousins killed by

a drunk driver. Id.
The tape recorded proceeding not only fails to indicate any
response to the judge's question by Mr. Carter but also indicates
the judge failed to pause to allow Mr. Carter time to respond.
Defense counsel moved to strike Mr. Carter for cause indicating to
- 3

-

the court, "you've got to be prejudicefd] if your wife's been
broadsided by a drunk driver." (T. 17). The judge continued her
inquiry of the venirepersons:
JUDGE:

Let me just ask a couple of further inquires. Uh,

let me put it to each of you, uh again. Would the
relationships that you have with either people who have
been involved in collisions. A couple of you answered to
that urn, or your knowledge of that cause you any difficulty
in hearing uh, the case today.

In other words, do you

think that would enter into your decision so that you could
not follow the instructions that the court will give you on
the law.

Uh, [a]nd I believe it was Mr. Carter and Mr.

Matsuno, who answered to specifically about people they
knew were involved.
people.

I don't know if there were some other

Mr. Carter, would you have any difficulty in

hearing the case today, based upon . . . . I asked you that
previously, based upon your knowledge of what occurred?
#4

I don't believe so. Everybody has there[sic] own moral

issue on alcohol and driving.
JUDGE:

But you f e e l t h a t r e g a r d l e s s of t h a t

experience

t h a t you have had p r e v i o u s l y , you could hear t h i s c a s e
j u s t , and d e t e r m i n e i t s o l e l y on t h i s c a s e .

The f a c t s

that

y o u ' l l d e t e r m i n e and t h e law t h a t w i l l be given t o you.
JUDGE:

And Mr. Matsuno, uh, t h e same q u e s t i o n t o you.

i n d i c a t e d p r e v i o u s l y , some r e l a t i o n s h i p .
#11:

I d o n ' t know how t o answer t h a t .

Uh, I have some

o p i n i o n s a s t o t h e way t h e law should b e .

You

(T. 17-18).

Whereupon a discussion was held in which Mr. Matsuno

indicated he did not believe he could follow the law and was removed
for cause.

No further questions were put to Mr. Carter.

Defense counsel challenged pursuant to Title 77, Chapter
35, Section 18, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) Mr. Carter for
cause.

The court denied the motion.

(T. 21). The defendant

subsequently exercised a peremptory challenge and Mr. Carter was
excused.
Utah's Legislature has established guidelines for removing
a juror for cause in criminal cases:
The challenge for cause is an objection to a
particular juror and may be taken on one or more of
the following grounds:

(4) The existence of any social, legal, business,
fiduciary or other relationship between the
prospective juror and any other party, . . . which
when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable
minds that the prospective juror would be unable or
unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of
favortism . . . .

(14) That a state of mind exists on the part of the
juror with reference to the cause, or to either
party, which will prevent him from acting
impartially and without prejudice to the substantial
rights of the party challenging . . . .
§77-35-18(e), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).
The Utah Supreme Court has established as prejudicial error
compelling a party to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a
venireman who should have been excused for cause.
665 P.2d 1311 (Utah 1983).

State v. Lacey,

The Court in Lacey also found the "trial
- 5
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court must determine by a process of logic and reason, based upon
common experience, whether the juror can stand in attitude of
indifference between the state and the accused."
State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981).

J^d. at 1312 citing

Although the Court in

Lacey noted it might have been better to have excused the juror who
had been treated by the doctor who testified in the rape case, and
who had a business relationship with the investigating officer, the
Court found no error in leaving the juror on the panel.

It should

be noted, however, that the credibility of both of the witnesses
whom the juror knew in Lacey was not questioned, nor was their
testimony crucial to the prosecution's case.

Lacey at 1312.

In State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22 (Utah 1984) the Court found
no prejudicial error in failing to remove one challenged juror for
cause who had had training in drug abuse in the army and who had
friends who were police officers.

The Court found no indication of

an impression so strong or so deep so as to constitute bias.

The

Court did, however, find prejudicial error in refusing to remove a
Mr. Butler for cause in this distribution of controlled substance
case.

Mr. Butler indicated he "had a problem with the criminal over

the police officer."

I_d. at 26. Butler further acknowledged if the

evidence were close he felt the detectives should be give the
benefit of the doubt.

Id.

In Jenkins v. P a r r i s h ,
malpractice s u i t ,

627 P.2d 533 (Utah 1 9 8 1 ) , a m e d i c a l

t h e Court found a j u r o r ' s a d m i s s i o n she was b i a s e d

toward t h e p h y s i c i a n - d e f e n d a n t ,

d e s p i t e her d e s i r e t o remain

and i m p a r t i a l should have r e s u l t e d
cause under Rule 4 7 ( f ) ( 6 )

in a s u c c e s s f u l

Utah R. C i v . P .

challenge

Rule 47 ( f ) ( 6 )

fair
for

provides

for a challenge for cause when a "state of mind exists on the part
the juror with reference to the cause • . . which will prevent him
from acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial
rights of the party challenging."

Utah R. Civ. P. 47.

The Court

noted "[a] statement made by a juror that she intends to be fair and
impartial loses much of its meaning in light of other testimony and
facts which suggest bias."

Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d at 536.

The trial court in this case never adequately determined
whether Mr. Carter

could "stand in attitude of indifference between

the state and the accused."

State v. Lacey at 1312.

The fact that

the trial court is entitled to perform voir dire is not to say that
the trial court should fail to exercise the discretion conferred on
it by state law.

Although there is no strict test to apply, the

accused should be granted every reasonable protection.

State v.

Lockett, 654 P.2d 433, 438 (Kansas 1982), State v. Camarillo, 678
P.2d 102, 104 (Idaho App. 1984).

The courtfs lengthy

question,

summarized by asking Mr. Carter if he would "have any difficulty in
hearing the case today" failed to ascertain whether he might have
any bias in hearing the case before him.
In State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1980), the
Supreme court reversed the conviction because the trial court failed
to rebut a clear inference of bias, and subsequently failed to
remove a juror for cause.

The trial court in the case at bar never

determined if Mr. Carter could listen to and try the case without
prejudice as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 47.
bias was never rebutted.

The clear inference of

Forcing the defense to exercise a

- 7

-

peremtory challenge to remove Mr, Carter resulted in prejudicial
error when the facts pointed to a state of mind which reasonably
inferred prejudice.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RESTRICTING DEFENSE^
COUNSEL'S QUESTIONING OP PROSPECTIVE JURORS
DURING VOIR DIRE.
During voir dire, defense counsel asked the court to
explain the minimum and maximum penalties for Driving Under the
Influence of Alcohol in Utah and further to inquire if anyone
thought the penalty was either too harsh or too light. (T.15).

The

court refused to allow the question to be put to the panel. Id.
Defense counsel took exception to the court's ruling. Id.
In State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984), the Court held
failure of the trial court to inquire of the non-drinking jurors in
a DUI case whether their abstenance from alcohol was for religious
reasons was reversible error. One non-drinking juror in Ball was
then allowed to serve on the jury.

In Ball the Supreme Court noted

"exploration of the attitudes and convictions that may exist in a
person who belongs to these groups is certainly permissible to aid
in discovering actual bias or prejudice relating to the subject
matter of particular case."

I^d. at 1057.

"Voir dire is intended to

provide a tool for counsel and the court to carefully and skillfully
determine by inquiry, whether biases and prejudices, latent as well
as acknowledged, will interfere with a fair trial if a particular
juror serves on it."

Id. at 1058.

In People v. Williams, 628 P.2d 869, 877 (Cal. 1981) the
court concluded:
[c]ounsel should aj: least be allowed to inquire
into "matters concerning which either the local
community or the population at large is commonly
known to harbor strong feelings that may stop
short of presumptive bias in law yet
significantly skew deliberations in fact." citing
United States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376, 381,
(D.C. Cir. 1973)
In the case at bar, neither party had the opportunity to
determine whether potential jurors should be removed because they
believed the penalty was either too harsh or too lenient. Defense
counsel does not dispute the court's exclusive control (at the
misdemeanor level) over sentencing within the statutory guidelines,
but stresses imposition of penalty and beliefs regarding penalty are
not to be confused.

In another court, defense counsel has had the

experience of having a juror removed for cause who felt the
statutory six-month maximum on a DUI conviction was too light a
penalty.

Any such similar jurors in this case would have been

challenged by the defense. Failure of the court to allow inquiry
regarding views toward penalty unjustly curtailed Mr. Tuero's right
to a fair trial. His conviction should therefore be reversed.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Tuero asks this Court to reverse his conviction or in
the alternative to remand his case to the Fifth Circuit Court for a
new trial.

7

Respectfully submitted this y^

day of May,1987.

-ELIZABETH A< BdWMAN
Attorney foe/Defendant
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I, ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN, hereby certify that four copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellant will be delivered to the Salt Lake
City Prosecutor's Office 451 South Second East, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 this

(r

<3ay of May, 1987.

.-"-"ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
DELIVERED by
day of May, 1987.
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ADDENDUM A

77-35-18. Rule 18 — Selection of jury, (a) The clerk shall draw by
lot and call the number of the jurors that are to try the cause plus such
an additional number as will allow for all peremptory challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror shall be called
to fill the vacancy before further challenges are made, and any such new
juror may be challenged for cause. When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors remaining, and each side,
beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until
all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then
call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, in the order in which they appear on the list, and the
persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury.
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the
examination of the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter event, the court may permit counsel or the defendant
to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper,
or may itself submit to the prospective jurors additional questions
requested by counsel or the defendant.
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror.
(1) Thej>anel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particularcourt
or for the trial of a particular action. A challenge to the panel is an objection made to all jurors summoned and may be taken by either party.
(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from the procedure prescribed with respect to the selection, drawing,
summoning and return of the panel.
274
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(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is sworn
and shall be in writing or recorded by the reporter. It shall specifically
set forth the facts constituting the grounds of the challenge.
(Hi) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a hearing may be had to try any question of fact upon which the challenge is
based. The jurors challenged, and any other persons, may be called as * witnesses at the hearing thereon.
(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If the challenge to the panel
is allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far as the trial in question
is concerned. If a challenge is denied, the court shall direct the selection
of jurors to proceed.
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for
cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the jury
is sworn to try the action, except the court may, for good cause, permit
it to be made after the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is
presented. In chaUenges for_cause the rules relating to challenges ^to^a
panel and hearings theron shall apply. All challenges for cause shall be
taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense.
(d) A peremptoryjchallenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory
challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory
challenges. In misdemeanor jases^each sidejsjsntitled to three peremptory
challenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may allow the
defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly.
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and
may be taken on one or more of the following grounds:
(1) Want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law;
(2) Any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of
performing the duties of a juror,
(3) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person
alleged to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the
prosecution was instituted;
(4) The existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other relationship between the prospective juror and any party, witness or person
alleged to have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that ^
the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict
which would be free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because he is indebted to or employed by the state or a political
subdivision thereof;
(5) Having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil
action, or having complained against or having been accused by him in a
criminal prosecution;
(6) Having served on the grand jury which found the indictment;
275
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(7) Having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for
the particular offense charged;
(8) Having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge,
and whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without as verdict
after the case was submitted to it;
(9) Having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the
defendant for the act charged as an offense;
(10) If the offense charged is punishable with death, the entertaining
of such conscientious opinions about the death penalty as would preclude
the juror from voting to impose the death penalty following conviction
regardless of the facts;
(11) Because he is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or
interested in earring on any business, calling or employment, the carrying
on of which is a violation of law, where defendant is charged with a like
offense;
(12) Because he has been a witness, either for or against the defendant
on the preliminary examination or before the grand jury;
(13) Having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or
*y> (14) That a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference
to the cause, or to either party, which willprevent him from acting impartially and without prejudice Jto the substantial rights of the party challenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public journals or
common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly upon
the matter to be submitted to him.
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and
then by the defense alternately. Challenges for cause shall be completed
before peremptory challenges are taken.
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impanelled. Alternate
jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall replace jurors, who are,
or become, unable or disqualified to perform their duties. The prosecution
> and defense shall each have one additional peremptory challenge for each
alternate juror to be chosen.
Alternate jurors shall have the same qualifications, take the same oath
and enjoy the same privileges as regular jurors.
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a juror is a privilege of the
person exempted and is not a ground for challenge for cause.
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall be administered to the
jurors, in substance, that they and each of them will well and truly try
the matter in issue between the parties, and render a true verdict according to the evidence and the instructions of the court |
History: C. 1953, 77-35-18, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 14, § 1.

Cross-References.
Alternate juror, 78-46-6.
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